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INTRODUCTION 
Since the tragic events of September 11, 2001, thousands of well-intentioned individuals 
have been working feverishly to prevent, protect from, respond to, and recover from 
natural and man-made incidents of national significance. Billions of dollars have been 
expended to build capacity at all levels of government to meet the mission demands of 
the new policy arena of homeland security. Homeland security, at least in definition, has 
come full circle since 9/11. Today, homeland security is narrowly defined as dealing 
predominantly with acts of terrorism.1 However, as the initial shock of the 9/11 terror 
attacks wore off, state and local governments began the process of taking on the 
expanded mission space prescribed by the new normalcy in the nation. As state and 
local governments found their footing in this new arena, they were able to absorb the 
new demands of homeland security into the existing mission space found in public 
safety and emergency management. The national government, however, has remained 
focused primarily on acts of terror. This divergence in perspective has led to ever-
increasing tensions between the national government and state and local governments 
when policies related to homeland security national preparedness are at issue. 
At the core of the set of challenges that confront national, state, and local government 
officials concerning homeland security national preparedness public policy are a set of 
assumptions, upon which current and evolving policies are based, that are suspect if not 
fatally flawed. The policy outcomes resulting from these faulty assumptions (and 
facilitated by hindering institutional pathologies, misguided policies, and bad policy 
instruments) have left the nation less prepared than is possible had forward-thinking, 
aggressively applied modern public management models been used as the foundation 
upon which national preparedness could be established. The assumptions brought into 
focus in this article are: 
1. There is an idealized level of national preparedness; achieving a prescribed level 
of preparedness to respond to events of national significance, whether man-made 
or natural in origin, is possible based on current or foreseeable resource levels. 
2. The federal government is obliged to direct the development of national 
preparedness policy to ensure that state and local governments are working 
toward policy compliance and are providing full accountability for grant funds.  
3. Current homeland security public policy is coherent, embraces an all-hazards 
approach to national preparedness and reflects the comprehensive involvement 
of state and local governments in its development, deployment, and 
implementation. 
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After a brief discussion of research methodology, this article traces the evolution of 
national preparedness policies and describes the institutional pathologies and policy 
instruments that have inhibited national preparedness. The next section provides 
analysis related to the research and an explanation of why the assumptions identified 
above are flawed. Finally, recommendations are offered that might allow the next 
administration and those with public safety, emergency management, and homeland 
security responsibilities at the state and local level insights into building community 
resilience and governance capacity that raises preparedness to as high a level as 
possible.   
Methodology 
This research project is part of an ongoing research agenda focused on homeland 
security national preparedness public policy. The approach taken is qualitative in nature 
and is characterized by the examination of behaviors of individuals and institutions 
found in this policy arena, comprehensive literature reviews, and hundreds of informal 
interviews with officials at the local, state and national level who are directly involved in 
the development, deployment, and implementation of homeland security national 
preparedness public policy. Additional data were gathered from field research 
associated with national preparedness assessment activities. 
The focus of the research has been on Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, 
National Preparedness (HSPD-8)2 and its complement, HSPD-5, Management of 
Domestic Incidents.3 These directives lay the foundation of all subsequent policy 
development related to homeland security national preparedness. By parsing the policy 
guidance and goals found in these documents, it is possible to establish points of 
comparison when the current policy environment is fully developed. Judgments 
concerning the efficacy of policies, instrumentalities, and behaviors are based on 
observation and substantiated by research found in refereed journals and books related 
to the field of interest. 
HOMELAND SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVES 
A series of “foundational” documents began to populate the homeland security policy 
arena after 9/11.  Along with the seminal legislation found in the Homeland Security Act 
of 20024 came a series of documents such as the National Homeland Security Strategy5 
and Homeland Security Presidential Directives providing policy guidance to federal, 
state, and local governments. The directive most associated with national preparedness 
is HSPD-8. The purpose of the directive was to guide the development of policy for “all 
hazards preparedness for domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters and other 
emergencies.”6 The document described preparedness as the existence of plans, 
procedures, policies, training, and equipment for governments to maximize their 
respective abilities to deal with major events.  The directive dealing with management 
of domestic incidents (HSPD-5) is an integral companion document to the national 
preparedness directive, because HSPD-5 directs the development of a national Incident 
Command System (ICS) and a National Incident Management System (NIMS), both of 
which are key elements of national preparedness policy implementation. 
CLOVIS, PROMISES UNFULFILLED 
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME IV, NO. 3 (OCTOBER 2008) WWW.HSAJ.ORG  
 
3 
There are several significant policy guidelines to be found in HSPD-8 that have direct 
bearing on current policies related to national preparedness. Though the directives are 
rich in content, the focus should be on those clauses that have spawned the most 
contentious and pernicious policy instruments. Those guidelines direct the secretary of 
DHS to: 
1. Build support for and assessment of state and local first responders. 
2. Develop methods for effective, efficient, and timely delivery of federal assistance 
to state and local governments. 
3. Focus on terrorist events (emphasis added). 
4. Establish measurable readiness priorities and targets that appropriately balance 
the potential threat and magnitude of terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other 
emergencies with the resources required to prevent, respond to, and recover 
from them (emphasis added). 
5. Develop standards for preparedness assessments and strategies and a system of 
assessing national preparedness. 
6. Base a grant award system on risk calculations related to population 
concentrations and critical infrastructure. 
7. Develop quantifiable performance measures for federal, state, and local 
governments. 
The primary mechanisms for influencing behaviors at the state and local level have been 
the awarding of grant funds to “encourage” desired behaviors, primarily from the states.  
“The awards will be delivered in a form that will allow the recipients to apply the 
assistance to the highest priority preparedness requirements at the appropriate level of 
government.”7 
The complementary guidelines found in HSPD-5 are that the secretary of DHS will: 
1. Develop a single approach for domestic incident management. 
2. Develop and administer a National Incident Management System that will meet 
mission requirements “regardless of cause, size or complexity.”  The system will 
also allow jurisdictions to track resources. 
3. Establish national standards for qualification and certification in this area of 
interest. 
4. Develop a National Response Plan based on an all-discipline, all-hazards 
approach to incident management.8 
From these artifacts came a series of support documents further outlining the policy 
intentions of DHS.  Those documents include the National Preparedness Goal, National 
Preparedness Guidance, the Target Capabilities List (TCL), a revised National Strategy 
for Homeland Security, and the National Preparedness Framework.  
 The significant contributions of these documents were the introduction of national 
planning scenarios, the concept of capabilities-based planning and direction to state and 
local governments to “enhance regional collaboration.”9  The approach to expanding and 
developing implementing directives for HSPD-8 were perhaps well intentioned but 
displayed a lack of knowledge of and an insensitivity to the policy environment of state 
and local governments.10 With each subsequent document and volume of guidelines 
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related to homeland security grants, the tone and directness moved from partnering and 
facilitation to dictating more and more requirements for compliance with non-legislated 
regulatory regimes based on limited theoretical development and no appreciation for 
the impact in dollars and labor on state and local officials charged with public safety, 
emergency management, and homeland security responsibilities. In essence, HSPD-8 
and its spawn could be characterized as a direct assault on the stability of American 
federalism and intergovernmental relations, particularly in this policy arena.11 
HONORING THE PRINCIPLE OF FEDERALISM 
In a broader context, there has long been discussion of the ebb and flow of American 
federalism and whether or not the continual march toward centralization of power in 
the national government will ever abate. Throughout history, power has shifted toward 
the central government whenever the country faced a crisis (Civil War, World Wars, 
Great Depression, 9/11, etc.), faced an increase in the complexity of government (Great 
Depression, Post-war recoveries, self-sustaining tax authority, etc.) or faced times of 
incredible creation of wealth (post-World-War II, post-Korean War, Reagan to Bush 
administration years). Efforts on the part of presidential administrations and the courts 
to shift power back toward the states have been haphazard at best. Devolution, where 
authority and program controls are shifted to state governments is not the same as 
decentralization. Within this dynamic cauldron of churning intergovernmental 
relations, where does one find the discussion of federalism as it relates to homeland 
security? The discussion is necessary to provide context for the evolution of policy. 
There is growing literature addressing the difficulties imposed on American 
federalism and intergovernmental relations by the current policy regime related to 
homeland security national preparedness.12  Though there are innumerable versions of 
governance schemes identified as meeting the criteria of “federalism,” there are but 
three dominant federalism theories – Cooperative, Coercive, and Competitive – that 
manifest in various institutional pathologies and behaviors in contemporary America. 
These theories and their application to homeland security national preparedness have 
been fully developed.13 To further develop the connection between theories and 
behaviors, however, one could easily apply the templates found in the 
intergovernmental management (IGM) models developed by Agranoff and McGuire.  
The table below illustrates the features of each of the IGM models, how these models 
align with contemporary theories of federalism, and how these models might overlay the 
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Table 1.  Contemporary Intergovernmental Management Models.14 
MODELS 
Top-Down Donor-Recipient Jurisdiction Network 
Policy development 
concentrated at the 
national level. 
State and local 
governments coerced 
into implementing 
policies with high 
compliance 
requirements and little 
flexibility. 
Funding found in 
categorical grants with 
stringent 
accountability. 
Policies developed at 
the national level to 
treat “national” issues. 
State and local 
governments 
implement policies for 
national government 
but have some 
flexibility in 
implementation to suit 
constituent needs. 
Funding categorical 
but less stringent in 
compliance. 
Center of policy and 
planning focused on 
the local jurisdiction. 
Planning is strategic in 
nature, placing the 
jurisdiction at the 
center of the planning 
process and the 
recipient of all 
potential support 
coming from other 
jurisdictions or levels 
of government. 
Funding, if available, 
focused on meeting 
constituent 
preferences. 





collaboration to meet 
common needs, 
particularly in times of 
crisis. 
Support based on 
temporary excess 
capacities. 
Network expanded to 
include other 
jurisdictions and 
levels of government. 








Reflective of a more 
collaborative form of 
Federalism 
Enforced Behaviors Mutual Dependencies Centralized Planning Capacity 
Augmentation  
Current homeland 








state, and local 
interactions related to 





plans that allow for 
deliberate, effective 
resource planning and 
management. 
Would allow 
jurisdictions to build 
an expectation of 
augmentation to own-
source capacities 




The Agranoff and McGuire Donor-Recipient model represents the notion that 
government actors have mutual dependence. Jurisdictions at different levels of 
government cooperate even though there might be tensions or conflicts related to 
program activities. This arrangement aligns conveniently with Cooperative Federalism 
characteristics. Policy implementation takes place at the intersection of goal setting and 
carrying out actions. The donor does not have the time or inclination to interfere and 
the recipient must balance conformity and compliance with seeking jurisdictional goals.  
This model seems to fit most longstanding interactions related to well-established grant 
programs and organizations like those found with the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency and state emergency management officials. Unfortunately, another one of their 
models characterizes nearly all other aspects of homeland security national 
preparedness intergovernmental relations.   
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The Top-Down model matches the developed characteristics of Coercive 
Federalism.15 In the Top-Down model, direction comes from the national government 
with state and local governments executing policy. The pernicious nature of this model 
is found in the behavior of the national government, forcing cooperation among actors 
with little or no discretion available at the state and local level.16 
Even though the federal homeland security policy apparatus has been reminded time 
and again of the need to embrace alternative public management models, particularly in 
this arena, the administration and its operatives have become less collegial and more 
directive in their approach to policy development and implementation.17 As Conlan and 
Dinan describe, the Bush administration has been generally dismissive of federalism 
concerns across a wide front of policy areas and homeland security policy is no 
exception.18 The foundational documents related to homeland security, authored in the 
immediate aftermath of 9/11, gave strong acknowledgment to federalism as a controlling 
and guiding principle in policy development.  The most recent documents, however, give 
no mention of federalism and have changed the rhetoric from seeking coordination and 
collaboration with state and local partners to merely seeking consultation with other 
levels of government. These changes in tone and continued centralization of policy 
power have not gone unnoticed by state and local governments across the country.19 
State and local governments seek guidance from the national government that, when 
implemented, is revenue neutral and actually facilitates mutual aid arrangements that 
minimize rent seeking, free riding, and policy entrepreneurship. Documents like the 
Target Capabilities List (TCL) have not been subjected to comprehensive cost-impact 
analysis until recently, yet the preparedness and performance measures outlined in the 
TCL (and being pushed on jurisdictions by DHS) are taking on the status of “standards” 
which, if pursued, will distort state and local government budget and policy priorities.20 
If one accepts the notion that this administration and the supporting bureaucracy 
have demonstrated behaviors dismissive and disdainful of federalism, one should not be 
surprised by the increased resistance to centralized policy developments related to 
public safety, emergency management, and homeland security as perceived at the state 
and local levels.21 As if the situation were not tenuous enough as it relates to federalism, 
one should be particularly mindful of the inhibiting effects institutional pathologies 
have had on developing sound, workable national preparedness policies. 
INSTITUTIONAL PATHOLOGIES 
Eugene Bardach cautions those with interests in public policy to be on guard when 
analyzing policy options.22 If changing a single pathology or overcoming one barrier 
would eliminate a properly identified policy problem, why has that pathology or barrier 
not already been eliminated? The reason may be that there are some things that cannot 
be changed in the policy arena. There are institutional pathologies that might inhibit 
good policy development, but many of these behaviors are such that the marginal return 
in trying to change them may not be worth the cost of so doing. Similar caution would 
be prudent in examining the other institutions that comprise the homeland security 
national preparedness policy arena. This section examines the institutional pathologies 
of Congress, DHS, the Executive Branch and state and local governments and how those 
behaviors influence homeland security national preparedness public policy.  
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The Congress of the United States 
There are several behaviors of Congress that have direct influence on the public policy 
arena. Many of the behaviors of Congress conspire to make the development of optimal 
policy outcomes difficult at best. However, a prudent policy analyst should be aware of 
those behaviors that are not likely to change.   
The first of those pathologies that are not likely to change is the notion that elected 
representatives behave in such a manner as to first assure re-election, then begin the 
work of those to whom they are accountable.23 Another set of behaviors not likely to 
change are those associated with preemptions of state and local government 
prerogatives and the propensity to advance policy regimes for which there is little or no 
financial support at the state and local level. These unfunded mandates have an 
extremely deleterious impact on state and local government revenues and expenditures 
but are not likely to change in the foreseeable future.24  There are some outcomes of this 
behavior, however, that do have an impact, directly and indirectly, on national 
preparedness.   
One of the most interesting aspects of the combinations of preemptions and 
mandates found in legislative and regulatory regimes is the impact of indirect taxation 
associated with passing program costs on to the constituents of the state and local 
governments. These state and local representatives of constituents who have not asked 
for these programs are left to use jurisdictional own-source revenues to support the 
implementation of nationalized programs. This indirect taxation is imposed on 
taxpayers and consumers without the benefit of shared information between the 
government and its constituents. The impact of the indirect taxation is not 
insignificant.25 Analysis of data gathered by the National Conference of State 
Legislatures indicates that the average state must use an additional 5.1% of its operating 
budget to meet the unfunded requirements associated with implementation and 
administration of national grants-in-aid programs.26  This percentage translates to a $71 
billion tax levy across the nation, or over $236 for each man, woman, and child in the 
country. The $71 billion is revenue that must be taken from supporting programs 
preferred by the state and local constituents to be applied to programs that may or may 
not benefit those same constituents and for which no preference may have been 
expressed.   
This imposition of mandate is indicative of a central government tendency to overtax 
constituents as a manifestation of revenue maximization.27 Likewise, rather than 
decentralization of programs – something needed in complex systems – devolution of 
programs has meant increased tax and revenue requirements for state and local 
governments.28 Based on interviews and informal surveys, few taxpayers are aware of 
the impact of unfunded or under-funded mandates on their individual situations. 
Interviews of state and local bureaucrats, however, elicit quite a different response.  
Nearly to a person, these individuals are not only aware of the impact of unfunded or 
under-funded mandates, but they must work to find the offsets in state and local 
operating budgets so that national funds continue to flow into their respective 
jurisdictions. Even if the behaviors of Congress in the above areas are unlikely to 
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change, there is one area in which such change might be effected: oversight of the 
Department of Homeland Security.   
Congress, as part of the checks and balances of this nation’s federal form of 
government, provides oversight and funding for executive branch agencies that develop, 
deploy, and execute policies based on congressional input. Congressional oversight is 
manifested in its committee structures in both houses and in the rules of conduct for 
both the House and Senate. Using the Department of Defense as a model of a complex 
organization for which Congress must provide considerable oversight, there are some 
thirty-six committees in both the House and Senate that have responsibilities for 
oversight of the department. However, only six of these committees (House and Senate 
Armed Services Committees, House and Senate Defense and Military Construction 
Committees, and House and Senate Appropriations Sub-Committees) have any 
substantive authority over or impact on the Department of Defense. The oversight of 
DHS is somewhat more complex, with no less than seventy-nine committees and 
subcommittees claiming some form of oversight. Congressional leaders have chosen to 
protect prerogatives associated with oversight of the legacy agencies that comprise the 
current DHS rather than streamlining oversight for more effective department 
management and operation.29 This means that all 100 senators and 412 of the 435 
members of the House have input to the oversight of the department.  One cannot help 
but be struck by the fact that the Department of Defense, given its $400+ billion budget, 
is more than ten times the size of DHS yet has far less oversight.30   
On average, at least one senior DHS representative provides testimony to one of these 
committees every day Congress is in session. As one who has had to prepare for 
congressional testimony in the past, the author can state that preparation for such 
appearances can take days or weeks of full-time concentration of a department’s staff.31  
If the staff is preparing for congressional testimony, it is not likely to be able to deal 
(with any level of credible effort) with day-to-day operations or developing long term 
objectives. The complexity and pervasiveness of demands on senior department staff 
from Congress lead to inefficient and sub-optimized functionality. Likewise, if senior 
staff are focused on congressional oversight, then midlevel bureaucrats are, by default, 
more likely to end-run senior leaders in the department given the extraordinary access 
to Congress these individuals are given. Even with all the attention paid to homeland 
security in the wake of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina, analysis of funding levels for the 
department indicate that those levels have not increased outside the average increase for 
any other department, while federal grants-in-aid funds for homeland security have 
actually declined.32 
The Department of Homeland Security 
In March of 2003, DHS became a fully operating department of the executive branch, 
with its secretary given full cabinet rank. Since DHS began operations, the department 
has undergone no less than five major reorganizations, including three since the 
celebrated Second Stage Review (2SR) in 2005. This lack of continuity in organization 
has led to several other problems that have impeded the department in fully meeting 
expectations and in fulfilling its assigned missions. These management challenges are 
well documented, most notably by the Government Accountability Office (USGAO).33 
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Although staffing of the department seems to be one of the critical shortfalls, many 
capable officials are working diligently, doing the best they can. Unfortunately that 
effort, complicated by congressional oversight issues, has led the department to craft ill-
defined and ambiguous national preparedness policy that in turn has led to ill-defined 
and ambiguous implementation standards and objectives. Subsequently, much of the 
public policy related to program administration has been slow in development and 
implementation due mostly to the lack of qualified people to orchestrate the complex 
networks of stakeholders to reach consensus on policy decisions. Likewise, much of the 
policy has been sub-optimized and has had to be retooled at the behest of those asked to 
implement the policies, because the policies did not adequately address such 
fundamental issues as the constitutionality of policies or the feasibility of policies based 
on existing or potential resource limitations. 
There are foundational documents that should guide the development of public policy 
related to homeland security national preparedness. Subsequently, the policy coming 
from the National Preparedness Directorate of FEMA (the latest variant) dictates the 
distribution of federal grant funds supporting homeland security initiatives. What has 
been difficult to ascertain is exactly how policy parameters are being formed in the 
department and who is actually guiding the effort to develop national preparedness 
policy. Many offices have operational “taskings” associated with policy development, but 
none claim to be the guiding force behind the efforts. Given this ambiguity, many offices 
in FEMA are either attempting to capture turf or are working to avoid taking 
responsibility for policy development or implementation. Currently, there are two 
processes being developed to assess national preparedness and no less than four other 
“assessment” processes being evaluated for integration into a single process intended to 
apply to all 39,000 general purpose jurisdictions in the country. None of these programs 
have been evaluated for imposed cost or labor implications. 
In a recent analysis conducted by the author of the potential for integrating the two 
prominent national assessment programs, simply answering the survey required by just 
one of the programs could potentially cost state and local governments $660 million in 
own-source resources. Add to that cost the expense of satisfying initial National Incident 
Management System compliance and state and local governments must find a total of 
$1.2 billion in own-source funding. As was stated earlier, the TCL has not been 
subjected to a realistic cost analysis until recently, but not much imagination is needed 
to grasp the potential cost of 39,000 jurisdictions complying with more than 2,500 
preparedness and performance measures. Recent cost-impact analysis of only a few 
“common” capabilities outlined in the TCL indicate the imposition of initial costs of $4.7 
billion for acquisition and annual costs of $3.4 billion for sustainment.34  All but a few 
jurisdictions will have no ability, or incentive, to strive for compliance with NIMS or the 
TCL. Given the lack of appreciation for the realities of scarce resources at the state and 
local level, there are few reasons for governments below the national level to take the 
TCL seriously. 
State and Local Governments 
State and local government are entities that provide goods and services based on some 
form of revenue and expenditure scheme that reflects the preferences of the constituents 
of those governmental entities. Using this definition, there are approximately 39,000 
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jurisdictions (counties, cities, towns, villages, etc.) providing an array of public goods 
and services to constituents.35 These jurisdictional entities are significant when 
discussing homeland security, because these jurisdictions have the task of fulfilling 
homeland security responsibilities by attempting to ensure that all measures have been 
taken to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from catastrophic events. 
After all, all disasters are local. 
All but one state and nearly all the sub-state jurisdictions are constitutionally bound 
to balance their respective annual budgets. State and local governments are also 
typically bound to higher levels of scrutiny and accountability, because these 
governments are closer to their constituents. The accountability of state and local 
government manifests itself through public meetings for all government activities, 
public budgets, outside auditing, competitive bidding practices for procuring services, 
and many other activities in which transparency is demanded by the citizens.   
Most state (and local) governments operate on budget cycles that generally are 
annual or biennial in nature.36 All but nine states have some form of state income tax 
system tied to the federal income tax system. When the economy is doing well, state 
revenues are generally very strong. However, when the nation is in a recession, the 
impact on state income tax revenues is often extremely stressful for state governments.  
Most states also use a sales tax to support further revenue generation. Corporate taxes 
and user fees tend to round out state tax revenue schemes. 
Local governments often are faced with tough budget situations and are normally 
funded through property taxes and fee systems for services. Many large metropolitan 
areas also use local sales and income taxes to support government operations. The 
variety of taxes available to most sub-state jurisdictions is limited, which leads to other 
difficulties when resources are stressed. 
Given that competitive forces are strong at the state and local level, finding a balance 
between providing preferred public goods and services and funding those goods and 
services with an appropriate and acceptable tax and fee structure is perhaps the most 
difficult challenge for state and local legislators and administrators. There is significant 
resistance on the part of both administrators and constituents to raising taxes, so 
revenue streams are restricted at best.37 
As was mentioned previously, the perspectives of those at the state and local level are 
different from those at the federal level. When focused on governance and homeland 
security, state and local officials worked diligently to achieve a new equilibrium in 
spending and expansion of existing public safety and emergency management mission 
space to include “homeland security.” As the executive director of a prominent 
emergency management organization expressed, “Terror is another hazard to be 
included in our all-hazard approach to accomplishing our mission.”38 Survey data 
confirm that state and local governments, when considering the hazards that most 
influence planning and resource allocation, consider acts of terror ranking alongside 
drug trafficking and school shootings. These events are considered the least likely high 
consequence events to occur in most jurisdictions. The only jurisdictions that consider 
terrorism a realistic priority are those with large, dense populations with significant 
infrastructure that might attract terrorist interests.  
There are a couple of points that should be made so as to provide a broader context 
for the discussion of reallocation of resources and funding the expanded homeland 
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security mission space at the state and local level. Over time, however, funding at the 
state and local level has stabilized to the point that there is a new equilibrium for 
revenues and expenditures at the state and local level. This behavior is consistent with 
competitive federalism tenets and belies the argument that competition leads to a “race 
to the bottom.” 
The second point to make is that in the aftermath of 9/11, constituents made their 
preferences known to their agents (elected or appointed representatives) but have 
subsequently decided that if more revenue is to be spent on homeland security 
initiatives that money will have to come from other programs (for which preferences 
have changed) or from revenue-neutral intergovernmental transfers. After having 
reached a new equilibrium, they will not entertain discussion of increases in taxes to 
further expand public safety, emergency management, or homeland security 
capabilities.39 Most jurisdictions in the United States are spending exactly as much as 
they need to spend on homeland security. Unless the federal government provides state 
and local jurisdictions revenue-neutral or revenue-positive funding, it is unlikely state 
and local governments will expend greater resources than are already being spent. 
In recent years, the general behavior of state governments, when enjoying budget 
surpluses, has been to provide tax cuts to the citizens, increase allocations to “rainy day” 
funds, broaden the client base for social programs, provide incentives to particular 
industries to attract them to the states, or a combination of these techniques.40 The 
sensitivity of constituents to marginal tax rates sometimes forces states to focus on 
short-term solutions rather than look to the future to secure stability in the fiscal regime 
of the state. Likewise, constituents have become sensitive to broadening client bases 
when surpluses are small but seem more generous when surpluses are unexpectedly 
large. No matter the situation with budget surpluses, state and local governments act to 
increase their competitive positions relative to other peer jurisdictions.41 
One of the most important revenue streams for state and local governments is the 
federal tax revenue repatriated through grants-in-aid. In fiscal year 2004, the last year 
for which complete data are available, state and local governments received 31.9 percent 
of their operational revenue from the federal government. Although state and local 
governments may appear to be addicted to the repatriated revenue, they are not in favor 
of categorical grants and the persistence of unfunded or under-funded aspects of the 
programs supported through these grants. The weakening of the relative position of the 
state and local governments in the current intergovernmental relations scheme has been 
affected by the loss of some fiscal autonomy.42 Further, state and local governments 
want most of the grants moved from categorical grants to block grants. Block grants 
provide state and local governments the flexibility needed to apply the funds where they 
best serve constituent needs and eliminate the requirement to use own-source funds to 
ensure full implementation and administration of the programs supported by the 
funds.43 
There are some difficulties in getting Congress or executive department agencies to 
move to block grants as neither can claim credit for the distribution of funds to pet 
projects or districts. In countless conversations with federal level bureaucrats 
concerning homeland security grants, the common theme is that the state and local 
governments need to be accountable for the funds they are receiving. In truth, 
homeland security grant funds comprise less than one half of one percent of the overall 
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operating budgets of state and local jurisdictions, and homeland security is a distant, 
minor priority in the general budgeting scheme of all but a few jurisdictions.44 What 
federal officials fail to grasp is that state and local officials are not accountable to the 
federal government but to their constituents. 
Given the current administration’s movement from program analysis to performance 
management, most grant programs fair poorly. The use of the Performance Assessment 
Rating Tool (PART) process has caused considerable friction and tension between the 
federal government and state and local governments attempting to administer grant 
programs. Not surprisingly, block grant programs perform the worst with this system.45 
Ironically, the most effective public program operating today is the Temporary Aid to 
Needy Family program where the funds are given to the states with wide discretion in 
how to implement and management program activities.46   
To date, all DHS administered grant programs have focused on building capacity 
without attention to funding to support required human capital and sustainment. This 
factor can be mapped back to Congressional pathologies. The instructions found in 
grant application materials are explicit about what can and cannot be purchased. Many 
jurisdictions now have new fire trucks, ambulances, and police vehicles, but few have 
been able to add staff to operate the new equipment. Subsequently, jurisdictions have 
been able to replace aging equipment with new equipment, but have added no capability 
and little capacity to their operations. Further evidence of the ineffectiveness of grant 
distributions has been the phenomenon of fewer and fewer jurisdictions applying for 
grant funding, because those jurisdiction cannot, or will not, overcome the opportunity 
or transaction costs associated with pursuing homeland security grant dollars.47 This 
single phenomenon has had dramatic impact on federal level policy developers who are 
having difficulty explaining the reluctance of some state and most local governments to 
feed at the homeland security public trough. 
The distribution of funds under the current grant programs is uneven at best. States 
with high populations and population densities receive relatively little funding per 
capita compared to states with low populations and population densities. The 
distribution of funds related to other homeland security programs outside those 
administered by FEMA may dilute the overall effectiveness of the internal grant 
programs, because the funds are distributed to highly concentrated areas (although the 
funds to fulfill these grant requirements are taken from the national tax revenue base). 
State and local administrative agents for homeland security grant funding do not see 
most of these funds as they are passed directly to agencies at the local level. At present, 
there is no mechanism available to examine the balance of all grant programs, nor are 
there any mechanisms to level grants to ensure more equitable distribution of funds. 
Even with recent changes to the state homeland security grant program distribution 
formula, the baseline distribution of funds is still unbalanced in favor of small 
population states. 
THE ASSUMPTIONS AND THE CURRENT POLICY ENVIRONMENT 
There are a number of assumptions, or elements of conventional wisdom, related to 
homeland security national preparedness public policy that must be addressed. Based 
on the discussion above, the following paragraphs examine the assumptions upon which 
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current policies are being developed and why the assumptions are flawed. If the 
assumptions are flawed, then any subsequent policies forthcoming will be flawed as 
well.  As Ingraham advises, if the policy problem has been properly identified, it is not 
likely that policy errors will have to be corrected after implementation.48 Further, bad 
assumptions lead to a distorted view of the current policy environment. In order to find 
reasonable solutions to reestablish national preparedness policy efficacy, we must 
appreciate the realities that compel behaviors at the state and local level to be contrary 
to those desired by an insensitive national government. 
  This assumption is indicated by examining the HSPDs and subsequent policy 
documents associated with homeland security national preparedness. The Department 
of Homeland Security has based most of its preparedness planning on the fifteen 
national scenarios that address natural and man-made disasters, which range from 
response to a conventional improvised explosive device to the detonation of a nuclear 
weapon inside the United States. The Target Capabilities List (TCL),49 a document 
outlining some 2,500+ preparedness and performance measures in thirty-seven target 
capabilities for national, state, and local governments, is predicated on matching 
capabilities at each level of government with the “requirements” to meet a particular 
scenario. Though supposedly not prescriptive, the TCL is gaining the status of being a 
“standards” document for all general purpose jurisdictions in the country.50 Similarly, 
the document has only recently been subjected to any level of cost analysis. That 
analysis indicates that the costs of meeting the requirements found in a handful of 
common capabilities far exceed the level of grant funding available to general purpose 
jurisdictions through all of the grant programs associated with homeland security and 
managed by DHS. 
The major problem with the assumption above is that the level of preparedness 
outlined in the TCL is unattainable. There are simply not enough resources available for 
the 39,000 general purpose jurisdictions to build the capacities suggested in the TCL. 
The expectation implied in the assumption is that state and local general purpose 
jurisdictions will spend own-source revenues to build the capacities outlined in the TCL. 
State and local governments, however, are already spending all they are going to spend 
on public safety, emergency management, and homeland security. The budget priorities 
of state and local governments reflect the preferences of constituents. Typically, the 
priorities of state and local governments concentrate the majority of spending on 
education, transportation, job training, development, income security, and health care. 
There is very little left in public coffers to expand public safety and emergency 
management funding beyond the level preferred by citizens within the respective 
jurisdictions.51 For the national government to think otherwise is indicative of  
insensitivity to, or ignorance of, the dynamics of budget priorities of governments below 
the national level. 
In the days immediately following the attacks of 9/11, policy documents placed 
emphasis on including state and local governments in the policy process and, in 
particular, addressed the need to honor the principles of federalism. However, as time 
passed and policy development evolved, state and local governments became less 
partners and more instruments of policy implementation. One of the most vocal 
complaints heard from state and local officials is that federal officials, particularly in 
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DHS, have not provided officials below the national level a strong enough voice in policy 
development and implementation. 
One of the common complaints voiced by those in DHS and Congress is that state and 
local jurisdictions must be accountable for the funding received through grant 
programs. To that end, DHS officials have increased grant reporting requirements with 
each version of the grant guidance since 2004. Subsequently, state and local officials 
have stopped applying for grant funding because the transaction and opportunities costs 
associated with gaining grant funding cannot be overcome. Therefore, most of the 
jurisdictions that applied for funding early on have stopped applying. The federal 
government demand for accountability and the directive nature of policy documents 
provide few incentives for state and local governments to participate in policy 
development and give the impression that homeland security is no longer a national 
problem requiring collaboration but a federal problem requiring compliance. State and 
local government authorities would be much more likely to collaborate with federal 
officials if the national government appeared to be interested in collaboration, 
facilitation, and optimization of preparedness based on the resources available, rather 
than continuing to coerce jurisdictions into spending funds that are currently applied to 
the preferences of citizens. 
One other point pertaining to this assumption needs to be highlighted. The amount of 
homeland security grant funding coming to state and local governments is less than 0.3 
percent of the operational budgets of state and local governments. The coercive 
approach employed by DHS to gain compliance with the National Incident Management 
System or with the TCL loses its impact when the funding levels are so low to begin with 
and have been declining every year since 2002.52 
Homeland security national preparedness public policy, as documented in the latest 
version of the National Strategy for Homeland Security,53 is focused on applying the 
efforts of the nation to preventing, protecting from, responding to, and recovering from 
acts of terrorism. At the state and local level however, “terror” is considered as yet 
another hazard that must be addressed in the expanded public safety and emergency 
management mission space. One of the major complaints from state and local officials is 
that the federal government is “all terror-all the time,” leaving preparedness for the 
more frequent occurrences of fires, floods, hurricanes, tornados, and earthquakes as an 
afterthought for which little is being done at the national level. 
Perhaps one of the key challenges undermining the above assumption is that all-
hazard national preparedness is a top-down requirement that must have federal 
government stewardship. In fact, preparedness in communities around the country is a 
bottom-up proposition that requires application of contemporary public management 
models to build capacities for community resilience and to ensure that help is available 
in times of crisis. One must remember that all disasters are local and few events ever 
rise to the level of national significance. Similarly, when communities respond to 
requests for help, they provide temporary excess capacity – that amount of help 
available at the time of the event for a specific time. Perhaps most significant is the fact 
that capacities in communities ebb and flow based on funding, conditions, preferences, 
and demographic changes. These capacities are not finite and fixed. Federal government 
officials would be well served to remember that most events are local, focused, and 
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discrete, and any response builds from the bottom up to include support from other 
jurisdictions horizontally and from different levels of government vertically. 
If the one can accept that the assumptions listed above might be suspect, then one 
should be interested in whether there might be institutional pathologies, misguided 
policies, and bad policy instruments that further exacerbate the sub-optimization of 
national preparedness. The next section, however, discusses of the key foundational 
documents that have guided the evolution of national preparedness public policy. 
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
Does the description of the current policy environment provided above support the 
assumptions currently guiding national preparedness policy development? The answer 
is a resounding “No.” 
The first assumption asserts that the nation can achieve an idealized level of 
preparedness based on current or foreseeable resources. Certainly, the national policy 
documents seem to indicate that there is some idealized level of preparedness to which 
each jurisdiction must contribute. However, this is simply not possible. No amount of 
coercion on the part of the national government will compel state and local governments 
to spend money they do not – or will ever – have. State and local governments are 
accountable to their citizens and cannot alter budgetary priorities focused on the 
compelling needs of education, job training, transportation, development, income 
security, and health care. Further, state and local governments absorbed homeland 
security mission requirements into the existing mission space found in public safety and 
emergency management. Without an increase in homeland security grant funding, state 
and local governments will be left to augment preparedness and increase community 
resilience based on public management models other than the ones in place at this time. 
The second assumption states that the national government should direct the 
development of national preparedness policy and ensure that state and local 
governments comply with the guidance and account for all homeland security grant 
funds. In the study of economics, good information is required to make sound economic 
decisions. It is preposterous for the national government to assume that officials in DHS 
have enough information to make decisions about what is best for the citizens of 
Florida, Kansas, or Arizona. The one-size-fits-all approach to policy development belies 
any sensitivity to the fact that perhaps conditions might be different in each state, 
county, city, and village.   
The second element of this assumption presumes that the grant program is effective 
in altering the preparedness landscape of state and local governments. Given that many 
jurisdictions have decided they cannot overcome the transaction or opportunity costs 
associated with applying for grants, the need for accountability may be lessening. 
Similarly, the amount of money being distributed to state and local governments is of 
little consequence in the typical budget scheme found below the national level of 
government. 
The third assumption concerns the efforts of the national government to build 
national preparedness policy based on the full involvement of state and local 
governments that includes a full appreciation of an all-hazards approach to emergency 
management and public safety. As can be seen in the evolution of the most recent policy 
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documents, state and local governments have been consulted about but not included in 
the policy development process. If state and local governments are to augment 
preparedness levels, they must do so based on a strong reliance on a bottom-up 
approach as opposed to accepting a top-down approach that most likely does not fit the 
needs of constituents. 
If the key assumptions upon which national preparedness policies are based are 
flawed, there are changes that can occur that will allow the nation to achieve a level of 
preparedness above current levels – if new assumptions are advanced. What might 
those new assumptions be that would allow a different frame of reference for those 
charged with preparedness responsibilities, regardless of level of government? 
The first assumption should be reshaped to acknowledge that the level of 
preparedness possible in the country is bounded by the resources available to federal, 
state, and local governments. The greatest constraints are found below the national 
level. The second assumption needs to be modified to allow for state and local 
governments to meet the needs of constituents by working toward guidelines, not 
mandates, for national preparedness. Further, grant funding should be given in the form 
of block grants with maximum flexibility available to recipients. If the national 
government cannot live with this level of latitude, then perhaps no money should be 
given at all, given that the current amount is so small compared to other revenue 
streams. Finally, the national government should perhaps take on the role of facilitator 
rather than dictator and cede policy sovereignty to a shared form of policy development 
focused on the needs of sub-national governments. If the underlying assumptions upon 
which policies are based are changed, then perhaps recommendations can be fashioned 
that will allow the nation to achieve the level of preparedness possible within the 
immutable constraints that are not likely to change. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Rather than rehashing the material entered above, perhaps the focus should be on 
addressing the Agranoff and McGuire jurisdiction and network models and examining 
whether or not these models might allow state and local jurisdictions to increase 
community resilience and preparedness. The models must be examined together, 
though, as doing one without the other does not seem to optimize their collective value. 
The jurisdiction model asks the government entity to place itself in the center of a 
policy arena and focus on planning that will allow the jurisdiction to achieve its strategic 
objectives. As the jurisdiction develops its strategic objectives, the planning process 
should develop outcomes that include all own-source assets and should identify those 
assets that need to be acquired. Perhaps the jurisdiction can apply for grant funding.  
Perhaps the jurisdictions can enter a cooperative agreement with the state. The idea is to 
harness, in the planning process, all the resources the jurisdiction might need to meet its 
long-term objectives. 
If the focus of the planning process conducted by the jurisdiction is to enhance 
community resilience and augment preparedness, then the government entity should be 
the capacity center, meeting preparedness needs horizontally from other similar 
governments and vertically from different levels of government. With a comprehensive 
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planning effort in support of the jurisdiction model, the government entity will have 
identified the resources needed to meet requirements. 
The next step is to apply the network model to the preparedness strategy developed 
using the jurisdiction model. The basis of building a viable, scalable, and effective 
network is to understand that the preparedness and response capacities of a jurisdiction 
are fluid and not fixed. In order to provide assistance to a neighboring jurisdiction, 
temporary excess capacities can be provided for a limited amount of time. At some point 
the capacity loaned to the neighboring jurisdiction must be returned to fulfill the needs 
of the lending jurisdiction. This advancement of temporary excess capacity is a key to 
augmenting capacities without incurring additional costs. 
An anecdote supports the use of these models to augment capacities from the bottom 
up. Recently, in a small town in the author’s home state, a grain elevator exploded due 
to the accumulation of grain dust ignited by an errant spark. There were several injuries 
and the elevator was rendered unsafe. In the ensuing response, jurisdictions throughout 
the region sent first responders to augment the local government’s efforts to treat the 
injured and secure the scene. The response, so typical of this part of the country, was 
based on the temporary excess capacities of those neighboring jurisdictions. The help 
was sent willingly without concerns for free riding and the response was mounted in an 
ad hoc manner without formal agreements. However, based on the nature of the 
preparedness environment and the political culture of this region, one can be assured 
that an informal network had been established that provided some assurance that help 
would be coming if needed. 
The incentives for local jurisdictions to follow these models are numerous. First, 
preparedness professionals can gain some certainty that needs are identified and 
resources are located that will allow the jurisdiction to meet its preparedness needs. 
Second, elected officials in the jurisdiction can be assured that preparedness 
augmentation can occur without incurring additional costs. These same individuals, the 
faces of most emergencies, will have a greater stake in ensuring that the network 
developed is extensive, comprehensive, and includes horizontal and vertical elements. 
Finally, the citizens of the communities involved can be assured that their government 
will be resilient in times of crisis and that their preparedness is as great as is possible 
given the resources and circumstances. 
CONCLUSION 
There is always hope for things to change, but the definition of insanity is doing the 
same things over and over again and expecting different results. It is time to end the 
insanity in homeland security national preparedness public policy. If officials at all 
levels of government do not change what is being done, national preparedness will 
continue to be at levels below what is possible.   
The first step to changing the direction of national preparedness policy is to revise the 
operating assumptions upon which these policies are based. The current assumptions 
are flawed and must be changed. 
The second step is to encourage state and local governments to adopt contemporary 
public management models for planning and augmenting preparedness from the 
bottom up. Local jurisdictions must embrace the notion that the safety and security of 
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their citizens lies in their hands and not wholly in the hands of the national government. 
By focusing on achieving strategic preparedness goals through networking, 
preparedness levels will increase without further distortions of budgets and without 
coercion from the national government to achieve levels of preparedness that are 
unattainable given the level of resources available. 
Finally, state and local governments must help the national government gain an 
appreciation of what all-hazards emergency management really means. Terrorism, 
perhaps the most compelling threat to national security, is not the only hazard for which 
government should prepare. The responsibilities at all levels of government are 
profound, so getting it right is essential – a national requirement.  
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